Targets like the worst of the New Atheists.” He complains, for example, that I respond to “weak Variety of general objections to arguments for God’s existence. Gage is similarly unhappy with my last chapter, wherein I deal with a wide Of the necessary being that is arrived at via the rationalist proof. Same attributes are less directly or obviously derivable from, say, the notion “add on” to the proof of the unactualized actualizer, but follows quite The derivation of the attributes isn’t some arbitrary Theory of actuality and potentiality provides analyses of change, causal power,Īnd perfection that can be quite naturally “plugged in” to the argument to yieldĪ derivation of these particular divine attributes. To argue for the immutability, omnipotence, and perfection of the purely actual For example, when you deploy the Aristotelian proof to establish theĮxistence of a purely actual actualizer, it is quite natural to move on immediately That there are certain divine attributes the derivation of which is more clearĪnd natural when one begins with a particular theistic proof than it is when Or probabilistic kind, but rather are attempts at demonstration. Inductive or probabilistic arguments for God’s existence at exactly two places,Ĭases I merely note that the arguments I am defending are not of the inductive Merely note that the arguments I am defending differ in several ways from the Note that atheists who raise a certain sort of objection against first causeĪrguments would complain if a parallel objection were raised against evolution In the first place, I merely note that theĪrguments I am defending are in several ways different from Paley’s designĬite Paley in a long list of philosophers who have defending theisticĭesign theory in exactly two places in the book, at p. Question, it doesn’t follow that he will have to reject the argument fromĪll, it simply isn’t true that the book describes Paley or Intelligent Design Philosophy and thus rejects these particular responses to the criticisms in Now, if the reader in question rejects A-T Or he might defend PSR by reference to the Scholastic idea that truth isĬonvertible with being, so that whatever has being must be intelligible.
For example, he might say that the worldĬannot be a necessary being because it is a compound of actuality and Objections in a way other philosophers would not. That is the necessary being, or such as a challenge to PSR. Suppose the reader is then presented with various objections to theĪrgument, such as the suggestion that it is the world itself rather than God That appeals to the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR) but makes no reference Suppose that some reader is initially convinced by an argument from contingency
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